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Abstract
People have heterogenous life expectancies: women live longer than
men, rich people live longer than poor people, and healthy people live
longer than sick people. People are also subject to heterogenous out-
of-pocket medical expense risk. We construct a rich structural model
of saving behavior for retired single households that accounts for this
heterogeneity, and we estimate the model using AHEAD data and the
method of simulated moments. We ﬁnd that the risk of living long
and facing high medical expenses goes a long way toward explaining
the elderly’s savings decisions. Speciﬁcally, medical expenses that rise
quickly with both age and permanent income can explain why the
elderly singles, and especially the richest ones, run down their assets
so slowly. We also ﬁnd that social insurance has a big impact on the
elderly’s savings.
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11 Introduction
Many elderly keep large amounts of assets until very late in life. Further-
more, the more income they earned during their working years, the slower
they run down their assets. Why is this the case? The importance of this
question should be clear, especially if one wishes to use models of saving
behavior for quantitative policy evaluation.
Previous studies have considered whether longevity and medical expense
risk can explain large asset holdings even at advanced ages. We extend this
work by developing a model that is consistent with the following key facts
about the U.S. data. First, women outlive men by several years. Second,
there is large variation in life expectancy conditional on permanent income
and health status. Third, even in presence of health insurance, out-of-pocket
medical and nursing home expenses can be large, and thus generate signiﬁ-
cant net income risk for the elderly.1
All of these elements aﬀect both individual savings behavior and the com-
position of the sample. For instance, heterogenous life expectancies can gen-
erate ﬂat (or even increasing) asset proﬁles after retirement for two reasons.
First, because income-rich people tend to live longer, as a cohort of people
grows older it becomes increasingly composed of the rich (Shorrocks [40]).
Second, these forces generate a lot of savings heterogeneity across individu-
als. For example, because women and the income-rich tend to live longer,
they need to save more in order to smooth consumption. This implies that,
as a cohort ages, it becomes increasingly composed of frugal people. For
these reasons we must consider both the theory and econometrics jointly to
provide a more complete understanding of savings behavior.
In this paper we study these determinants of savings in two steps. Using
the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) dataset, we
ﬁrst estimate the uncertainty about mortality and out-of pocket medical
expenditures as functions of sex, health, permanent income, and age.
Our ﬁrst step estimates show that average out-of-pocket medical expendi-
tures rise very rapidly with age. For example, average medical expenditures
for a woman in bad health rise from $1,200 at age 70 to $19,000 at age 100.
Also, and very importantly, medical expenditures after age 85 are very much
1See Attanasio and Emmerson [3], and Deaton and Paxon [13] for evidence on per-
manent income and mortality. See Hurd, McFadden, and Merrill [29] for evidence on
health status and mortality. See French and Jones [20, 21], Palumbo [35], Feenberg and
Skinner [18], and Cohen, Tell and Wallack [8] for evidence on medical expenses.
2a luxury good. While a sick 95-year-old woman at the 20th percentile of
the permanent income distribution expects to spend $2,700 on out-of-pocket
medical costs, an otherwise identical woman at the 80th percentile expects
to spend $16,000.
Our ﬁrst step analysis also conﬁrms that life expectancy can vary greatly.
For example, while a sick, 70-year-old male at the 20th percentile of the
permanent income distribution expects to live only 6 more years, a healthy
70-year-old woman at the 80th percentile expects to live 17 more years.2
In our second step, we construct a rich structural model of saving behavior
for retired single households, and estimate it using the method of simulated
moments. In particular, the model’s preference parameters are chosen so
that the permanent income-conditional age-asset proﬁles simulated from the
model match those in the data.
Notably, while our estimated values of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aver-
sion and the discount factor are in line with those provided by the previous
literature, the additional sources of heterogeneity that we consider allow the
model to ﬁt the data extremely well. Speciﬁcally, our estimated structural
model is not rejected when we test its over-identifying restrictions, which is
a feat that many structural models fail to achieve.
To gauge the importance of diﬀerent saving motives, we use our estimated
model to perform a number of decomposition exercises. We ﬁnd that the
diﬀerences in average medical expenditure by permanent income are very
important in explaining heterogeneity in asset decumulation decisions, while
the risk associated to these expenditures, while signiﬁcant, is not a key force.
Our baseline model predicts that, between ages 74 and 81, median assets
for those in the top permanent income quintile are approximately constant
at $150,000, which is roughly consistent with the data. When we eliminate
medical expense risk, but hold average medical expenses constant, we ﬁnd
that median assets for this group fall from $150,000 to $140,000 between ages
74 and 81. However, when we eliminate all medical expenses, median assets
for this group fall from $150,000 to $90,000 between ages 74 and 81.
We ﬁnd that social insurance programs such Supplemental Security In-
come and Medicaid (modeled as a “consumption ﬂoor”, following Palumbo [35]
and Hubbard et al. [25]) have large eﬀects on the elderly’s savings behavior,
including the richest ones. In the absence of the consumption ﬂoor, me-
dian assets for those in the top permanent income quintile would rise from
2These life expectancies are drawn from estimates summarized in Table 1.
3$150,000 to $220,000 between ages 74 and 81.
We also ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant portion of the higher saving of the high-
permanent income elderly is due to the fact that they have a longer longer
life-expectancy. If everyone had the survival probabilities of a healthy male
at the 50th percentile of the permanent income distribution, median assets
for those in the top permanent income quintile would fall from $150,000 to
$140,000 between ages 74 and 81.
In short, compared to the previous literature we obtain a much better ﬁt
of the model to the data, and we ﬁnd a larger eﬀect of medical expenses and
the consumption ﬂoor on the elderly’s saving decisions.
Among the most important and closely related works, Yaari [43] and
Davies [9] formulate and Hurd [27] estimates a structural model of bequest
behavior after retirement in which the time of death is the only source of un-
certainty. We build on their contributions by allowing, consistently with the
data, for heterogeneity in survival probabilities as functions of observables.
Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes [15, 16] document the high saving rates of the
richest. We build upon their empirical work by showing that even the richest
elderly dissave very slowly.
Palumbo [35] focuses on the eﬀect of medical expenses and uncertain
lifetimes. Unlike Palumbo [35], we ﬁnd that properly modeling medical ex-
penses can go much further towards accounting for the observed lack of asset
decumulation after retirement, at least for the elderly singles. This is per-
haps not surprising, as Palumbo’s model over-predicts consumption for those
with with the highest wealth by over 50% and those with the highest income
by 37%, which suggest that his model over-predicts asset declines in those
groups as well.
Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes [26] argue that means-tested social insur-
ance programs such as Supplemental Security Income and Medicaid provide
strong incentives for low income individuals not to save. Their simulations,
however, indicate that reducing the consumption ﬂoor has almost no eﬀect
on consumption levels for college graduates. This contrasts with our ﬁnding
that the consumption ﬂoor has a large eﬀect on savings decisions at all levels
of income. Our model of health costs indicate that medical expenses in old
age are so large that even the savings decisions of rich people are aﬀected
by insurance programs such as Medicaid. We believe that having higher es-
timated medical expenses also helps us ﬁt the data better than Hubbard et
al. For example, the simulations by Hubbard et al. imply thats asset de-
cline rapidly after age 70, which is inconsistent with the AHEAD data. Our
4model’s decumulation proﬁles, instead, do an excellent job of matching the
saving rate in the data.
The most likely cause of these diﬀerences is that, relative to our analysis,
Hubbard et al. and Palumbo understate medical expenses, both in terms
of levels and riskiness (see French and Jones [20, 21]), and they probably
understate the extent to which medical expenditures rise with age and per-
manent income. We ﬁnd diﬀerent medical expense processes for two main
reasons. First, we use a more realistic and ﬂexible speciﬁcation. Second, we
have access to newer and better data. These diﬀerences are at times quite
signiﬁcant: the average expense for a 100-year-old with some college gen-
erated by Hubbard et al.’s medical expenditure model is about 15% of the
average medical expense for a 100-year generated by our model. Although it
is not clear how our estimates compare to Palumbo, it seems likely that our
estimates are higher than his as well.
Hurd, McFadden and Gan [22, 28] study the heterogeneity embedded in
individuals’ subjective survival probabilities. They ﬁnd, similar to previous
work, that the subjective probabilities are on average consistent with those
from the aggregated life tables, but that there is considerable heterogeneity at
the individual level, some of which is helpful in predicting mortality. In this
paper we also disaggregate beyond the life tables. Our approach, however,
is to compute probabilities from the survival outcomes observed in our data.
We leave explorations of self-reported survival probabilities for future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce
our version of the life cycle model, and in section 3, we discuss our estimation
procedure. In sections 4 and 5, we describe the data and the estimated
shock processes that elderly individuals face. We also construct a very simple
measure of mortality bias, and show that the bias is signiﬁcant. We discuss
our results in section 6, which includes some robustness checks and some
decomposition exercises that gauge the forces aﬀecting saving behavior. We
conclude in section 7.
2 The model
Our analysis focuses on people that have retired already, which allows us
to concentrate on savings and consumption decisions, and abstract from labor
supply and retirement decisions. We restrict our analysis to elderly singles
to avoid the complications of dealing with household dynamics, such as the
5transition from two to one family members. We also sharpen our analysis by
excluding bequest motives, in order to isolate the potential eﬀects of medical
expense and mortality risk.
Consider a single person, either male or female, seeking to maximize his
or her expected lifetime utility at age t, t = tr,tr +1...,T +1, where tr is the
retirement age. These individuals maximize their utility by choosing current
and future consumption. Each period, the individual’s utility depends on its
consumption, c, and health status, m, which can be either good (m = 1) or
bad (m = 0).





with ν ≥ 0. The function δ(m), which determines how a person’s utility from
consumption depends on his or her health status, is given by
δ(m) = 1 + δm, (2)
so that when δ = 0, health status does not aﬀect utility.
We assume that non-asset income yt, is a deterministic function of sex,
g, permanent income, I, and age t:
yt = y(g,I,t) (3)
The individual faces several sources of risk, which we treat as completely
exogenous. While this is of course a simpliﬁcation, we believe it is a reason-
able assumption, especially since we focus on older people that have already
already shaped their health and lifestyle.
1) Health status uncertainty. We allow the transition probabilities for
health status to depend on sex, current health, and age. The elements of the
health status transition matrix are
πk,j,g,t = Pr(mt+1 = j|mt = k,g,t), k,j ∈ {1,0}. (4)
2) Survival uncertainty. Let sg,m,I,t denote the probability that an indi-
vidual of sex g is alive at age t+1, conditional on being alive at age t, having
time-t health status m, and enjoying permanent income I.
3) Medical expense uncertainty. Health costs, hct, are deﬁned as out-of-
pocket costs. We assume that health costs depend upon sex, health status,
age, permanent income and an idiosyncratic component, ψt:
lnhct = hc(g,m,t,I) + σ(g,m,I,t) × ψt. (5)
6Following Feenberg and Skinner [18] and French and Jones [21], we assume
that ψt can be decomposed as
ψt = ζt + ξt, ξt ∼ N(0,σ
2
ξ), (6)
ζt = ρhcζt−1 + ǫt, ǫt ∼ N(0,σ
2
ǫ), (7)
where ξt and ǫt are serially and mutually independent. In practice, we
discretize ξ and ζ, using quadrature methods described in Tauchen and
Hussey [41].
The timing is the following: at the beginning of the period the health
shock and the medical costs are realized. Then the individual consumes and
saves. Finally the survival shock hits.
Next period’s assets are given by
at+1 = at + y(rat + yt,τ) + trt − hct − ct, (8)
where y(rat + yt,τ) denotes post-tax income, the vector τ describes the tax
structure, and trt denotes government transfers.3
Assets have to satisfy a borrowing constraint:
at ≥ 0. (9)
Following Hubbard et al. [24, 26], we also assume that government transfers
provide a consumption ﬂoor:
trt = max{0,cmin + hct − [at + y(rtat + yt,τ)]}, (10)
Equation (10) says that government transfers bridge the gap between an
individual’s “total resources” (the quantity in the inner parentheses) and the
consumption ﬂoor. Equation (10) also implies that if transfers are positive,
ct = cmin and at+1 = 0.
To save on state variables we follow Deaton [12] and redeﬁne the problem
in terms of cash-on-hand:
xt = at + y(rt at + yt,τ) + trt − hct. (11)
Note that assets and cash-on-hand follow:
at+1 = xt − ct, (12)
xt+1 = xt − ct + y
￿
rt+1(xt − ct) + yt+1,τ
￿
+ trt+1 − hct+1, (13)
3We do not include received bequests as a source of income, because very few individuals
aged 65 or older receive them.
7To enforce the consumption ﬂoor, we impose
xt ≥ cmin, ∀t, (14)
and to ensure that assets are always non-negative, we require
ct ≤ xt, ∀t. (15)
Note that all of the variables in xt are given and known at the beginning
of period t. We can thus write the individual’s problem recursively, using the
deﬁnition of cash-on-hand. Letting β denote the discount factor, the value










subject to equations (13) - (15).
3 Estimation procedure
3.1 The Method of Simulated Moments
To estimate the model, we adopt a two-step strategy, similar to the one
used by Gourinchas and Parker [23], Cagetti [7], and French and Jones [20].
In the ﬁrst step we estimate or calibrate those parameters that can be cleanly
identiﬁed without explicitly using our model. For example, we estimate mor-
tality rates from raw demographic data. Let χ denote the collection of these
ﬁrst-step parameters.
In the second step we estimate the vector of parameters ∆ = (δ,ν,β,cmin)
with the method of simulated moments (MSM), taking as given the elements
of χ that were estimated in the ﬁrst step. In particular, we ﬁnd the vector
ˆ ∆ yielding the simulated life-cycle decision proﬁles that “best match” (as
measured by a GMM criterion function) the proﬁles from the data. Because
our underlying motivations are to explain why elderly individuals retain so
many assets, and to explain why individuals with high permanent income save
at a higher rate, we match permanent income-conditional age-asset proﬁles.
Our approach is similar to that of French and Jones [20].
Consider individual i of birth cohort c in calendar year t. Note that
the individual’s age is t − c. Let ˜ ait denote individual i’s assets. Sorting
8the sample by permanent income, we assign every individual to one of Q
quantile-based intervals. In practice, we split the sample into 5 permanent
income quintiles, so that Q = 5. Suppose that individual i of cohort c falls
in the qth permanent income interval of the sample. Let acqt(∆,χ) be the
model-predicted median asset level in calendar year t for an individual of
cohort c that was in the qth permanent income interval. Assuming that
observed assets have a continuous density, at the “true” parameter vector
(∆0,χ0) exactly half of the individuals in group cqt will have asset levels of
acqt(∆0,χ0) or less. This leads to a well-known moment condition:4
E
￿
1{˜ ait ≤ acqt(∆0,χ0)} − 1/2|c,q,t,individual i alive at t
￿
= 0, (16)
for all c, q and t. In other words, for each permanent income-cohort grouping,
the model and the data have the same median asset levels. Our decision to use
conditional medians, rather than means, reﬂects sample size considerations;
in some cqt cells, changes in one or two individuals can lead to sizeable
changes in mean wealth. Sample size considerations also lead us to combine
men and women in a single moment condition.
The mechanics of our MSM approach are fairly standard. In particu-
lar, we compute life-cycle histories for a large number of artiﬁcial individ-
uals. Each of these individuals is endowed with a value of the state vector
(t,xt,g,I,mt,ζt) drawn from the data distribution for 1995,5 and each is as-
signed a series of health, health cost, and mortality shocks consistent with
the stochastic processes described in the previous section 2.6 Solving numer-
ically the model described in section 2 yields a set of decision rules, which, in
combination with the simulated endowments and shocks, allows us to simu-
late each individual’s assets, medical expenditures, health and mortality. We
4See Manski [31], Powell [37] and Buchinsky [6]. Related methodologies are applied in
Cagetti [7] and Epple and Seig [17].
5Since we do not observe ζt directly, we infer it from individuals’ observed medical ex-
penditures, using the model of medical spending described below and standard projection
formulae.
6The simulated medical expenditure shocks are monte carlo draws from a discretized
version of our estimated medical expenditure process. In contrast, when simulating health
and mortality shocks, we give each simulated person the entire health and mortality history
realized by a person in the AHEAD data with the same initial conditions. (Although the
data provide health and mortality only during interview years, we simulate it in oﬀ-years
using our estimated models and Bayes’ Rule.) This approach ensures that the simulated
health and mortality processes are fully consistent with the data, even if our parsimonious
models of these processes are just an approximation. We are grateful to Michael Hurd for
suggesting this approach.
9then compute asset proﬁles (values of acqt) from the artiﬁcial histories in the
same way as we compute them from the real data. Finally, we adjust ∆ until
the diﬀerence between the data and simulated proﬁles—a GMM criterion
function based on equation (16)—is minimized.
We discuss the asymptotic distribution of the parameter estimates, the
weighting matrix and the overidentiﬁcation tests in Appendix B.
3.2 Econometric Considerations
In estimating our model, we face two well-known econometric problems
(see, for example, Shorrocks [40]). First, in a cross-section or short panel,
older individuals will have earned their labor income in earlier calendar years
than younger ones. Because wages have increased over time (with produc-
tivity), this means that older individuals are poorer at every age, and the
measured saving proﬁle will overstate asset decumulation over the life cycle.
Put diﬀerently, even if the elderly do not run down their assets, our data will
show that assets decline with age, as older individuals will have lower lifetime
incomes. Not accounting for this eﬀect will lead us to estimate a model that
overstates the degree to which elderly people run down their assets.
Second, wealthier people tend to live longer, so that the average survivor
in each cohort has higher lifetime income than the average deceased member
of that cohort. This “mortality bias” tends to overstate asset growth in an
unbalanced panel. In addition, as time passes and people die, the surviving
people will be, relative to the deceased, healthy and female. These healthy
and female people, knowing that they will live longer, will tend to be more
frugal than their deceased counterparts, and hence have a ﬂatter asset proﬁle
in retirement. Not accounting for mortality bias will lead us to estimate a
model that understates the degree to which elderly people run down their
assets.
A major advantage of using a structural approach is that we can address
these biases directly, by replicating them in our simulations. We address
the ﬁrst problem by giving our simulated individuals age, wealth, health,
gender and income endowments drawn from the distribution observed in the
data.7 If older people have lower lifetime incomes in our data, they will have
7It bears noting that we are assuming that there are no cohort eﬀects beyond those
captured in the distributions of wealth, health, gender and income by age. This simpli-
ﬁcation allows us to use the same set of decision rules for all cohorts, which signiﬁcantly
reduces our computational burden. Moreover, as shown below, it does not prevent the
10lower lifetime incomes in our simulations. We address the second problem by
allowing mortality to diﬀer with sex, permanent income and health status.
As a result our estimated decision rules and our simulated proﬁles incorporate
mortality eﬀects in the same way as the data.
4 Data
The AHEAD is a sample of non-institutionalized individuals, aged 70
or older in 1993. A total of 8,222 individuals in 6,047 households were in-
terviewed for the AHEAD survey in 1993 (in other words, 3,872 singles and
2,175 couples). These individuals were interviewed again in 1995, 1998, 2000,
and 2002. The AHEAD data include a nationally representative core sample
as well as additional samples of blacks, Hispanics, and Florida residents.
If it is discovered that a sample member dies, this is recorded and veriﬁed
using the National Death Index. Fortunately, attrition for reasons other
than death is relatively rare, and we can use the AHEAD data to estimate
mortality rates; as we show below, the mortality rates we estimate from the
AHEAD are very similar to the aggregate statistics. Because our econometric
approach explicitly models exit through death, we use the full unbalanced
panel, and include the life histories of people who die before our sample ends.
We consider only single retired individuals in the analysis. We drop all
individuals who were either married or co-habiting at any point in the anal-
ysis (so we include individuals who were never married with those who were
divorced or widowed by wave 1), which leaves us with with 3,510 individuals.
After dropping individuals with missing wave 1 labor income data and indi-
viduals with over $3,000 in labor income in any wave, we are left with 3,270
individuals. We drop 315 individuals who are missing in any period, leaving
us with 2,955 individuals, of whom 561 are men and 2,394 are women. Of
these 2,955 individuals, 1,430 are still alive in 2002.
We use the RAND release of the data for all variables except for medical
expenses. We use our own coding of medical expenses because RAND has
not coded medical expenses that people incur in their last year of life—the
AHEAD data include follow-up interviews of the deceased’s survivors. In ad-
dition, RAND’s imputation procedure does not account for high correlation
of medical expenses over time, especially in the earlier waves.
model from ﬁtting asset proﬁles across a wide range of ages.
11The AHEAD has information on the value of housing and real estate,
autos, liquid assets (which include money market accounts, savings accounts,
T-bills, etc.), IRAs, Keoghs, stocks, the value of a farm or business, mutual
funds, bonds, and “other” assets. Our measure of total assets is the sum
of these items, less mortgages and other debts. We do not include pension
and Social Security wealth for four reasons. First, we wish to to maintain
comparability with other studies (Hurd [27], and Attanasio and Hoynes [4]
for example). Second, since it is illegal to borrow against Social security
wealth and diﬃcult to borrow against most forms of pension wealth, Social
Security and pension wealth are much more illiquid than other assets. Third,
their tax treatment is diﬀerent from other assets. Finally, diﬀerences in
Social Security and pensions are captured in our model by diﬀerences in the
permanent income measure we use to predict annual income.
One problem with asset data is that the wealthy tend to underreport their
wealth in all household surveys (Davies and Shorrocks [10]). This leads to
understate asset levels at all ages. However, Juster et al. (1999) show that the
the wealth distribution of the AHEAD matches up well with aggregate values
for all but the richest 1% of households. This notwithstanding, problems of
wealth underreporting seem particularly severe for 1993 AHEAD wave (see
Rohwedder, Haider and Hurd [38]). As a result, we do not use the 1993
wealth data in our estimation procedure. (We use other 1993 data, however,
in constructing some of the proﬁles shown below.) Given that, and the fact
that we are matching median assets (conditional on permanent income), the
underreporting by the very wealthy should not signiﬁcantly aﬀect our results.
In addition to constructing moment conditions, we also use the AHEAD
data to construct the initial distribution of permanent income, age, sex,
health, health costs, and cash-on-hand that starts oﬀ our simulations. In
particular, each simulated individual is given a state vector drawn from the
joint distribution of state variables observed in 1995.
5 Data proﬁles
In this section we describe the life cycle proﬁles of the stochastic processes
(e.g., medical expenditures) that are inputs to our dynamic programming
model, and the asset proﬁles we want our model to explain.
125.1 Asset proﬁles and mortality bias
We construct the permanent-income-conditional age-asset proﬁles as fol-
lows. We sort individuals into permanent income quintiles, and we track
birth-year cohorts. Sample size considerations lead us to focus on 4 5-year
cohorts. The ﬁrst cohort consists of individuals that were ages 72-76 in 1995;
the second cohort contains ages 77-81; the third ages 82-86; and the fourth
cohort contains ages 87-91. We use asset data for 4 diﬀerent years; 1995,
1998, 2000 and 2002. It follows that for each of the 20 cohort-permanent
income cells, we observe assets 4 times over a 7-year span. To construct the
proﬁles, we calculate cell medians each year assets are observed. Because
some individuals die between 1993 and 1995, or fall outside the 4 cohorts
described above, the asset proﬁles use a subsample of the data, with 2,482
individuals.
To ﬁx ideas, consider Figure 1, which plots assets by age in each per-
manent income and cohort grouping for those that are still alive at that
particular moment in time. The lines at the far left of the graph are for the
youngest cohort, whose members in 1995 were aged 72-76, with an average
age of 74. We observe these individuals—if still alive—again in 1998, when
they were 77, and in 2000 (age 79) and 2002 (age 81). There are ﬁve lines
because we have split the data into permanent income quintiles. Unsurpris-
ingly, assets turn out to be monotonically increasing in permanent income,
so that the bottom left line shows median assets for surviving cohort-1 in-
dividuals in the lowest permanent income quintile, while the top line shows
median assets for surviving individuals in the top quintile.
For all permanent income quintiles in the youngest cohort, assets neither
rise nor decline rapidly with age. If anything, those with high permanent
income tend to have increases in their assets, whereas those with low perma-
nent income tend to have declines in assets as they age.
Next, consider the lines at the far right of the graph, which are for the
cohort whose members in 1995 were aged 87-91, with an average age of
89. The dynamics of assets for members of this cohort are similar to the
dynamics for the youngest cohort; the only exception is that wealth in the
highest permanent income quintile falls rather than rises with age.
It is worth stressing that the data shown in Figure 1 are drawn from an
unbalanced panel: at each point in time we take the people alive at that
moment to compute assets, hence many of the individuals used to calculate
the 1995 medians were deceased by 2002. Because poorer and/or less thrifty
13Figure 1: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: data
individuals have higher mortality rates, these proﬁles are aﬀected by mortal-
ity bias as time goes on. To get a sense of this mortality bias, Figure 2 shows
two sets of asset proﬁles. The ﬁrst set of proﬁles shows median assets for
every person still alive when the data are collected in a given wave; this is,
what was shown in Figure 1. The second set of proﬁles shows median assets
for the balanced panel, that is for the set of individuals that were alive in
all 5 waves. The diﬀerences between the two proﬁles can be interpreted as
mortality bias.
Figure 2 shows that when households are sorted by permanent income,
mortality bias is fairly small. This sorting, however, obscures any mortality
bias caused by diﬀerential mortality across the permanent income distribu-
tion. Figure 3 compares asset proﬁles that are aggregated over permanent
income quintiles and shows that if we do not condition on permanent income,
the asset proﬁles for those that were alive in the ﬁnal wave—the balanced
panel—have much more of a downward slope. The diﬀerence between the
two sets of proﬁles conﬁrms that the people who died during our sample
period tended to have lower permanent income than the survivors.
Since our model explicitly takes mortality bias and diﬀerences in perma-
nent income into account, it is the unbalanced panels that we use in our
14Figure 2: Median assets by birth cohort and permanent income quintile: every-
one in the data (solid lines) vs. survivors (dashed lines)
MSM estimation procedure.
5.2 Mortality and health status proﬁles
We estimate the probability of death and bad health as logistic functions
of a cubic in age; sex; sex interacted with age; previous health status; health
status interacted with age; a quadratic in permanent income; and permanent
income interacted with age.
Figure 4 shows mortality rates conditional on age, sex, previous health
status, and permanent income. The top panels are for women, while the
bottom ones are for men. The left panels refer to those that are healthy,
while the right ones refer to the unhealthy. The top left panel shows that
for women in good health last year the probability of death within one year
rises from 2% at age 70 to 25% at age 100.8 The four panels together show
that, conditional upon age, men, those in bad health, and those with low
8 Individuals in the AHEAD dataset are surveyed every two years. Thus we estimate
the two-year survival rate. We construct the one-year survival rate by taking the square
root of the two-year survival rate.
15Figure 3: Median assets by birth cohort: everyone in the data (solid lines) vs.
survivors (dashed lines)
permanent income are more likely to die than women, those in good health,
and those with high permanent income.
We, ﬁnd that controlling for previous health status greatly reduces the
estimated coeﬃcients associated with permanent income. However, as we
show below, people with high permanent income are much more likely to
be in good health, even when previous health status is taken into account.
Our results thus show that people with high permanent income have lower
mortality in part because they are more likely to be healthy.9
Figure 5 presents health transition probabilities conditional on age, sex,
previous health status, and permanent income. Consider the women ﬁrst.
The top left panel shows that the probability of being in bad health, condi-
tional on being in good health one year before, is about 10% at age 70 and
9Hurd, McFadden and Merrill [29] and Adams, Hurd, McFadden and Merrill, using
more sophisticated controls for previous health status, conclude that permanent income
is unrelated to both mortality and current health status once one controls for previous
health status. Unfortunately, Bellman’s curse of dimensionality limits us from using more
sophisticated controls for health status. Thus, our estimates should not be taken as causal.
Instead, our model should be taken as a parsimonious approximation that captures much
































































Probability of Death, by Permanent Income Percentile, Men, Bad Health
Figure 4: Mortality probabilities, by sex, permanent income percentile and
health status (women on top panels, men on bottom panels, healthy
on left panels, unhealthy on right panels)
rises to about 25% at age 100.10 Rich people are more likely to stay healthy:
being in the 80th percentile of the permanent income distribution instead of
the 20th percentile lowers the probability of moving into bad health by 5 to
10 percentage points. The graph on the top right shows that bad health is
a very persistent state. If a 70-year-old woman was in bad health one year
ago, there is almost a 90% chance that she will be in bad health this year.
Surprisingly, the probability of being in bad health this year, conditional on
10To ﬁnd one-year transition rates, we ﬁrst estimate the two-year Markov transition ma-
trix, Pt+2|t. We then assume that the one-year Markov transition matrix, Pt+1|t, satisﬁes
Pt+2|t = P2
t+1|t. Pt+1|t can then be found as the solution to a quadratic form. Details are




























In Good Health 1 Year Ago, Women



























In Bad Health 1 Year Ago, Women




























In Good Health 1 Year Ago, Men



























In Bad Health 1 Year Ago, Men
Probability of Being in Bad Health, by Permanent Income Percentile,
Figure 5: Health transition probabilities, by sex, permanent income percentile
and health status (women on top panels, men on bottom panels,
healthy on left panels, unhealthy on right panels)
being in bad health last year, falls with age.11 Rich people are more likely to
return to good health: having high permanent income reduces the probabil-
ity of being in bad health in the present, conditional in being in bad health
in the past.
The bottom two panels show that men are more likely to transition from
good health to bad health, and to remain in bad health, than women.
Table 1 presents the life expectancies implied by our mortality and health
11Although this result is surprising, one should recall that we are measuring the prob-
ability of still being in bad health and surviving, conditional on being in bad health last
period. The probability of either being dead or in bad health this year, conditional on
being in bad health last year, remains constant at about 90% at each age.
18status process. Although permanent income has only a modest eﬀect on mor-
tality rates, after conditioning on previous health status, it has a very strong
eﬀect on the probability of transitioning to bad health, where mortality is
higher. As a result, healthy men at the 20th percentile of the permanent
income distribution live 3 fewer years than healthy men at the 80th per-
centile, and healthy women at the 20th percentile of the permanent income
distribution live 3.2 fewer years than healthy women at the 80th percentile.
Our predicted life expectancy is lower than what the aggregate statistics
imply. In 2002, life expectancy at age 70 was 13.2 years for men and 15.8
years for women, whereas our estimates indicate that life expectancy for
men is 10.2 years for men and 15.0 years for women. These diﬀerences are
an artifact of using data on singles only: when we re-estimate the model for
both couples and singles we ﬁnd that predicted life expectancy is within 1/2
of a year of the aggregate statistics for both men and women.
5.3 Medical expense and income proﬁles
Medical expenses are the sum of what the individuals spend out of pocket
on insurance premia, drug costs, and costs for hospital, nursing home care,
doctor visits, dental visits, and outpatient care. It does not include expenses
covered by insurance, either public or private. French and Jones [21] show
that the medical expense data in the AHEAD line up very well with the
aggregate statistics. For our sample, mean medical expenses are $3,222 with
a standard deviation of $10,339. Although this ﬁgure is large, it is not
surprising, because Medicare does not cover prescription drugs, requires co-
pays for services, and caps the number of nursing home and hospital nights
that it pays for.
The log of medical expenses is modeled as a function of: a cubic in age;
sex; sex interacted with age; current health status; health status interacted
with age; a quadratic in permanent income; and permanent income interacted
with age.12
We estimate these proﬁles using a ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator. We use ﬁxed
eﬀects, rather than OLS, for two reasons. First, diﬀerential mortality causes
the composition of our sample to vary with age. In contrast, we are interested
in how medical expenses vary for the same individuals as they grow older.
12We assume that medical expenses do not aﬀect future health and survivor probabilities.
We also ignore the fact that, to some extent, the quantity of health care consumed is a
choice. (See Davis [11].)
19Income Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy
Percentile Male Male Female Female All†
20 8.2 6.2 13.8 11.9 12.0
40 9.1 7.0 14.8 12.9 13.0
60 10.1 7.9 15.9 14.1 14.1







Note: life expectancies calculated through simulations using estimated health transition
and survivor functions.
† Calculations use the same (permanent-income-unconditional) gender-health distributions
across all permanent income levels.
‡ Calculations use the health and permanent income distributions observed for each gender.
⋄ Calculations use the gender and permanent income distributions observed for each health
status group.
Table 1: Life expectancy in years, conditional on reaching age 70
Although conditioning on observables such as permanent income partly over-
comes this problem, it may not entirely. The ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator over-
comes the problem completely. Second, cohort eﬀects are likely to be impor-
tant for both of these variables. Failure to account for the fact that younger
cohorts have higher average medical expenditures than older cohorts will lead
the econometrician to understate the extent to which medical expenses grow
with age. Cohort eﬀects are automatically captured in a ﬁxed-eﬀect estima-
tor, as the cohort eﬀect is merely the average ﬁxed eﬀect for all members of
that cohort.
We have also estimated speciﬁcations of equation (5) that include cohort
20dummy variables (i.e., we regressed the estimated ﬁxed-eﬀects on cohort
dummies), which are statistically signiﬁcant. Unfortunately, allowing for dif-
ferences in medical expense and income parameters across cohorts requires
that the model be solved and simulated separately for each cohort, signif-
icantly increasing the computational burden. Nevertheless, our procedure
captures how medical expenses and income change with age.
Figure 6 presents average medical expenses, conditional on age, health
status, and permanent income for women. Average medical expenses for
men look similar to those of women, so we do not present them. We as-
sume that medical expenses are log-normally distributed, so the predicted


























































































Medical Expenses, by Permanent Income Percentile, Women in Bad Health
Figure 6: Average medical expenses, by permanent income percentile and health
status, for women (healthy on left panel, unhealthy on right panel)
Measured health status has only a modest eﬀect on average medical ex-
penses, but permanent income has a large eﬀect, especially at older ages.
Average medical expenses for women in good health are $2,000 a year at age
70, and vary little with permanent income. By age 100, they rise to $4,000
for women at the 20th percentile of the permanent income distribution and
to almost $26,000 for women at the 80th percentile of the permanent income
distribution. One might be concerned that we have few 100-year-old’s in
our sample, so that our predicted eﬀects arise from using assumed functional
forms to extrapolate oﬀ the support of the data. However, in our sample we
have 36 observations on medical expenses for 100 year old individuals, aver-
21aging $14,741 per year. Between ages 95 and 100, we have 483 person-year
observations on medical expenses, averaging $8,870 (with a standard devia-
tion of $20,783). Therefore, the data indicate that average medical expenses
for the elderly are high.
Medical expenses for the elderly are volatile as well as high. We ﬁnd that
the variance of log medical expenses is 2.15.13 This implies that medical ex-
penses for someone with a two standard deviation shock to medical expenses
pays 6.41 times the average, conditional on the observables.14
French and Jones [21] ﬁnd that a suitably-constructed lognormal distri-
bution can match average medical expenses, as well as the far right tail of
the distribution. They also ﬁnd that medical expenses are highly correlated
over time. Table 2 shows estimates of the persistent component ζit and the
transitory component ξit found by French and Jones. The table shows that
66.5% of the cross sectional variance of medical expenses are from the tran-
sitory component, and 33.5% from the persistent component. The persistent
component has an autocorrelation coeﬃcient of 0.922, however, so that inno-
vations to the the persistent component of medical expenses have long-lived
eﬀects. French and Jones in fact ﬁnd that most of a household’s lifetime
medical expense risk comes from the persistent component.
Parameter Variable Estimate
σ2
ǫ innovation variance of persistent component 0.0503
ρhc autocorrelation of persistent component 0.922
σ2
ξ innovation variance of transitory component 0.665
Table 2: Variance and persistence of innovations to medical expenses, as fractions
of total cross-sectional variance
13The measure of medical expenditures contained in the AHEAD is average medical
expenditures over the last two years. In order to infer the standard deviation of annual
medical expenditures, we multiply the two-year variance, 1.51, by 1.424. This adjustment,
based on the “Standard Lognormal” Model shown in Table 7 of French and Jones [21],
gives us the the variance in one-year medical expenditures that would, when averaged over
two years, match the variance seen in the two-year data.
14Let hc denote predicted log medical expenses. The ratio of the level of medi-
cal expenses two standard deviations above the mean to average medical expenses is
exp(hc+2σ)
exp(hc+σ2/2) = exp(2σ − σ2/2) = 6.41 if σ =
√
2.15.
22Our estimates of medical expense risk indicate greater risk than found
in other studies (see Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes [25] and Palumbo [35]).
However, our estimates still potentially understate the medical expense risk
faced by older Americans, because our measure of medical expenditures does
not include value of Medicaid contributions. Given that we explicitly model
a consumption ﬂoor, our conceptually preferred measure of medical expenses
would includes both expenses paid by Medicaid as well as those paid out of
pocket by households. Note that excluding Medicaid leads us to understate








































































Income, by Permanent Income Percentile, Unhealthy Women
Figure 7: Average income, by permanent income percentile and health status,
for women (healthy on left panel, unhealthy on right panel)
Income includes the value of Social Security beneﬁts, deﬁned beneﬁt pen-
sion beneﬁts, annuities, veterans beneﬁts, welfare, and food stamps. We
measure permanent income as average income over all periods during which
we observe the individual. Because Social Security beneﬁts and (for the most
part) pension beneﬁts are a monotonic function of average lifetime labor in-
come, this provides a reasonable measure of lifetime, or permanent income.
We model income in the same way as medical expenses, using the same
explanatory variables and the same ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator. Figure 7 presents
average income, conditional on age, sex, health status, and permanent income
for women. Given that income is largely from pensions and Social Security,
which depends on previous earnings, it is unsurprising that health has a very
small eﬀect on income. Holding permanent income ﬁxed, income for men
(not shown) is only slightly higher than income for women. (Men, however,
23typically have more permanent income than women.) Income trends up
slightly with age, which seems surprising given that most sources of income,
such as Social Security beneﬁts, should not change with age, after adjusting
for inﬂation. However, Social Security beneﬁts are tied to the CPI, whereas
we deﬂate all variables by the PCE index. Between ages 70 and 100, income
rises about 15%, or .5% per year. This is about the gap between the CPI
and PCE.
6 Results
6.1 Preference parameter estimates and model ﬁt
We set the interest rate to 2%. Table 3 presents preference parameter
estimates under several diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst column of Table 3
refers to our “baseline speciﬁcation,” in which we jointly estimate all of the
second stage parameters: the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, the discount
factor, the preference shifter due to health changes, and the consumption
ﬂoor. The other columns ﬁx one parameter at the time, that is, either the
preference shifter due to health shocks, or the consumption ﬂoor.
In this section, we discuss the baseline speciﬁcation. We discuss the
alternative speciﬁcations in section 6.2.
Figure 8 shows how well the baseline parameterization of model ﬁts a
subset of the data proﬁles, using unbalanced panels. (The model ﬁts equally
well for the cells that are not shown.) The model does a very good job at
matching the key features of the data that we are interested in: both in the
model and in the observed data individuals with high permanent income tend
to increase their wealth with age, whereas individuals with low permanent
income tend to run down their wealth with age.
A more formal way to assess the goodness of ﬁt of our model is to com-
pute the p-value of the overidentiﬁcation statistics. This value turns out to
be 97.8% for our baseline speciﬁcation. This is an exceptional result for a
structural model, as most estimated structural models are typically rejected
in overidentiﬁcation tests.
Figure 9 shows how well the model ﬁts the data when the asset proﬁles
are aggregated over permanent income quintiles. Here too the ﬁt is good.
Among other things, the model replicates much of the large asset decumu-
lation that occurs at very old ages. If anything, the model predicts less
24Baseline δ = 0 cmin = 5,000
Parameter and Deﬁnition (1) (2) (3)
ν: coeﬀ. of relative risk aversion 4.03 4.197 7.50
(0.97) (0.97) (2.34)
β: discount factor 0.965 0.966 0.923
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12)
δ: preference shifter, good health -0.197 0.0 -0.254
(0.20) NA (0.39)
cmin: consumption ﬂoor 2791 2660 5000
(318) (233) NA
Overidentiﬁcation statistic 37.0 38.4 73.8
Degrees of freedom 56 57 57
P-value overidentiﬁcation test 97.8% 97.2% 6.6%
Table 3: Estimated structural parameters. Standard errors are in parentheses
below estimated parameters. NA refers to parameters ﬁxed for a given
estimation.
asset decumulation at very old ages than what is seen in the data. Previous
models of consumption behavior, such as those of Hubbard [25] et al. and
Palumbo [35], have predicted more asset decumulation than what is seen in
the data at very old ages.
Figure 10 shows the consumption proﬁles predicted by the model, namely
median consumption by cohort and permanent income quintile. Figure 10
shows that the model generates ﬂat or decreasing consumption proﬁles for
most cohorts. This general tendency is consistent with most empirical studies
of older-age consumption, which suggest that consumption falls with age
(Banks, Blundell, and Tanner [5] using UK data, and Fernandez-Villaverde
and Krueger [19] using US data.) For example, Fernandez-Villaverde and
Krueger ﬁnd that non-durable consumption declines about one percent per
year between ages 70 and 90.
25Figure 8: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: data and model
Figure 10, in combination with the Euler Equation, can give some in-




t = β(1 + r)stEt(1 + δmt)c
−ν
t+1. (17)










Given that the survival rate, st, is often much less than 1, it follows from
equation (18) that the model will generate downward-sloping, rather than
ﬂat, consumption proﬁles, unless the discount factor β is fairly large.
Our baseline estimated coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, ν, is 4.03. This
parameter is identiﬁed by diﬀerences in saving rates across the permanent
income distribution, in combination with the consumption ﬂoor. Low income
households are relatively more protected by the consumption ﬂoor, and will
thus have lower values of V art(∆lnct+1) and thus weaker precautionary mo-
26Figure 9: Median assets by birth cohort: data and model
tives. The parameter ν helps the model explain why individuals with high
permanent income typically display less asset decumulation.
Our estimated coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion falls within the range
established by earlier studies. Our estimated coeﬃcient is generally higher
than the coeﬃcients found by ﬁtting non-retiree consumption trajectories,
either through Euler equation estimation (e.g., Attanasio, Banks, Meghir,
Weber [2]) or through the method of simulated moments (Gourinchas and
Parker [23]). Our estimated values are very much in line with those found by
Cagetti [7] who matched wealth proﬁles with the method of simulated mo-
ments over the whole life cycle. Our estimated coeﬃcient is lower than those
produced by Palumbo [35], who matched consumption data using maximum
likelihood estimation.15 Given that our out-of-pocket medical expenditure
data indicate more risk than that found by Palumbo, it is not surprising that
we ﬁnd less risk aversion.
We estimate that δ = −0.20: holding consumption ﬁxed, being in good
health lowers the marginal utility of consumption by 20%, although we can-
15It bears noting that most of these analyses do not contain a consumption ﬂoor. One
notable exception is Palumbo: our estimated consumption ﬂoor of about $2,800 in 1998
dollars, is in real terms very close to Palumbo’s ﬂoor of $2,000 in 1985 dollars.
27Figure 10: Consumption by cohort and PI quintile: model
not reject that this parameter is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to zero. Equation (18)
shows that an anticipated change from good to bad health leads to con-
sumption increasing by 5%. Note that as people age and health worsens,
Et(mt+1 −mt) becomes negative; multiplied by a negative delta, this implies
that consumption growth increases as people age and become sicker. The
data show that assets do decline more quickly at very old ages (see Fig-
ure 3), when people are most likely to be in bad health. A negative value
of δ, accelerating asset decumulation at older ages, is consistent with this
observation.
There is mixed evidence on whether bad health raises or lowers the
marginal utility of consumption, holding consumption ﬁxed. Lillard and
Weiss [30] and Rust and Phelan [39] ﬁnd that the marginal utility of con-
sumption rises when in bad health, while Viscusi and Evans [42] ﬁnd that it
falls.
Given that the model uses income-, health- and sex-adjusted mortality
proﬁles, its proﬁles should exhibit mortality biases similar to those found in
the data. Figure 11 shows simulated asset proﬁles, ﬁrst for all simulated
individuals alive at each date, and then for the individuals surviving the
entire simulation period. As in the data, restricting the proﬁles to long-term
28survivors shows greater evidence of asset decumulation. A comparison of
Figures 3 and 11 indicates that the size of the mortality bias generated by
the model is very similar to the one in the observed data.
Figure 11: Median assets by birth cohort: everyone in the simulations (solid
lines) vs. survivors (dashed lines)
6.2 Robustness checks
The remaining two columns of Table 3 present robustness checks on our
benchmark estimates. Given that we do not directly measure the consump-
tion or asset changes associated with bad health, one might question our
estimate of δ. In addition, previous empirical evidence does not convincingly
suggest that δ is greater than or less than 0. As a robustness check, we thus
set δ = 0 and re-estimate the other three parameters. These corresponding
estimates are in the second column of Table 3. Setting δ to zero has very
little eﬀect on the other parameter estimates. This is consistent with our
inability to reject that δ = 0 in our baseline speciﬁcation.
Next, we test whether our estimates are robust to our assumed consump-
tion ﬂoor, which is meant to proxy for Medicaid health insurance (which
largely eliminates medical expenses to the ﬁnancially destitute) and Supple-
mental Security Income transfers. Given the complexity of these programs,
29and the fact that many potential recipients do not fully participate in them,
it is tricky to establish a priori what the consumption ﬂoor should be.
Individuals with income (net of medical expenses) below the SSI limit are
usually eligible for SSI and Medicaid. For many individuals, however, the
consumption ﬂoor is well above the SSI limits, because some individuals with
income well above the SSI level can receive Medicaid beneﬁts, depending on
the state they live in. On the other hand, many eligible individuals do not
draw SSI beneﬁts, suggesting that the eﬀective consumption ﬂoor is much
lower.
In our benchmark case, we estimate our consumption ﬂoor to be about
$2,800, which is similar to the value Palumbo [35] uses. However, this esti-
mate is about half the size of the value that Hubbard et al. [25] ﬁnd, and is
also about half the average value of SSI beneﬁts. Thus we may be underes-
timating the true consumption ﬂoor.
In the third column of Table 3, we present estimates based on a con-
sumption ﬂoor of $5,000. Raising the consumption ﬂoor to $5,000 exposes
consumers less risk: the model compensates by raising the estimated value
of ν to 7.5. The corresponding estimates for the discount factor and utility
shifter are basically unchanged. It bears noting that when the consumption
ﬂoor is set exogenously to $5,000, the model ﬁts the data much more poorly.
The p-value for the overidentiﬁcation statistic is much lower in this case, only
6.6%, compared to 97.8% for the baseline speciﬁcation.
6.3 What are the important determinants of savings?
To determine the importance of the key mechanisms in our model we ﬁx
the estimated parameter values at their benchmark values and then change
one feature of the model at a time. For each of these diﬀerent economic
environments we then compute the optimal saving decisions, simulate the
model, and compare the resulting asset accumulation proﬁles to the asset
proﬁles generated by the baseline model.
We ﬁrst shut down out-of-pocket medical expense risk, while keeping
average medical expenditure (conditional on all of the relevant state vari-
ables) constant. Interestingly, and consistently with Hubbard, Skinner and
Zeldes [25], we ﬁnd that, conditional on constant average medical costs, the
risk associated with medical expenses has only a small eﬀect on the pro-
ﬁles of median wealth. Our results are also consistent with Palumbo’s [35]
ﬁnding that eliminating medical expense risk generates a modest increase
30in consumption, as a small increase in consumption translates into a small
decrease in assets.
We then ask whether out-of-pocket medical expenditures of the size that
we estimate from the data (and that are rising with age and permanent
income) have quantitatively important eﬀects on asset accumulation even
for the elderly rich. We thus zero out medical all out-of-pocket medical
expenditure for everyone and look at the corresponding proﬁles. This could
be seen as an extreme form of insurance provided by the government.
Figure 12 shows that medical costs are a big determinant of the elderly’s
saving behavior, especially for those with high permanent income, for whom
those costs are especially high, and who are relatively less insured by the
government-provided consumption ﬂoor. These retirees are reducing their
current consumption in order to pay for the high out-of-pocket medical costs
they expect to bear at the ends of their lives. This decomposition indicates
that modeling out-of-pocket medical costs is important in evaluating policy
proposals that aﬀect the elderly, like Social Security reforms.
Figure 12: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: baseline and model with no
out-of-pocket medical expenditures
Next, we reduce the consumption ﬂoor to $500. One could interpret this
as a reform reducing the government-provided consumption safety net (in a
31partial equilibrium framework, since everything else is held constant). The
eﬀects of this change are large. Individuals respond to the increase in net
income uncertainty by rapidly accumulating assets to self-insure. Figure 13
shows that this change aﬀects the savings proﬁles of both low- and high-
permanent-income singles. This indicates that the consumption ﬂoor matters
for wealthy individuals as well as poor ones. This is perhaps unsurprising
given the size of our estimated medical expenses; even wealthy households
can be ﬁnancially decimated by medical expenses.
Figure 13: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: baseline and model with a
$500 consumption ﬂoor
Finally, we turn to understanding the eﬀect of diﬀerential life expectancy.
As we have shown in Table 1, there are large diﬀerences in life expectancy
by sex, permanent income, and health status. To understand the eﬀect of
this source of heterogeneity we generate asset proﬁles assuming that everyone
faces the survival probability of a healthy male at the 50th percentile of the
permanent income distribution. Figure 14 shows that, even over the short
time period we are looking at, this diﬀerence in life expectancy would create
a noticeable eﬀect on asset accumulation, especially at the top end of the
permanent income distribution.
What would happen if we were to assume that everyone has survival
probabilities that depend only on age, but not on sex, health, or permanent
32Figure 14: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: baseline and model in which
everyone faces the survival probability of a healthy male at the 50th
percentile of the permanent income distribution
income? Interestingly, we ﬁnd that this would have negligible eﬀects on the
savings proﬁles, at least for a few years. This might indicate that there are
countervailing forces that aﬀect survival probabilities, and that these wash
out for most people, even the rich. For example, males tend to be richer, so
even if, controlling for permanent income, their expected survival is lower,
the eﬀect is counterbalanced by their higher permanent income. Figure 15
shows that the model ﬁts the data very well even when we assume that age
is the only variable aﬀecting survival.
7 Conclusions
Our paper provides several contributions.
First, it estimates medical expenses and medical risk faced by the elderly
using a better data set and a more ﬂexible functional form. As a result, we
ﬁnd that medical expenses are much higher and more volatile than previously
estimated, that they rise very fast with age, and that at very advanced ages
(that is starting from about age 80), medical expenses are very much a luxury
33Figure 15: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: baseline and model in which
everyone faces the average survival probability
good; i.e., they are much higher for elderly with higher permanent income.
Second, our paper carefully estimates mortality probabilities by age as
a function of health, sex, and permanent income and ﬁnds large variations
along all three dimensions.
Third, our paper constructs and estimates a rich structural model of sav-
ing by using the method of simulated moments. As a result of our careful ﬁrst
step-estimation and of the richer sources of heterogeneity that we allow for
in our model, we ﬁnd that our parameter estimates are very reasonable, and,
importantly, that our model provides a much better ﬁt to the data than that
previously obtained in the literature. In particular, our estimated structural
model ﬁts very well the saving proﬁles across the permanent income distribu-
tion, reproducing the observation that the dissaving rate of the elderly with
higher permanent income is much smaller than the one of the elderly with
lower permanent income.
Fourth, we ﬁnd that the sources of heterogeneity that we consider have
a signiﬁcant role in explaining the elderly’s saving behavior, with a very
high level of medical expenses at very advanced ages being a key factor.
Basically, if the single households live to very advanced ages, they are almost
sure to face very large out-of-pocket medical costs, and they thus need to
34keep a large amount of assets (an amount increasing in permanent income,
as medical expenses also increase) to self-insure against this risk.
Finally, we ﬁnd that a publicly-provided consumption ﬂoor has a large
eﬀect on the asset proﬁles for all people, even those with high permanent
income.
Our main conclusion is that to correctly evaluate any policy reform af-
fecting the elderly’s saving decisions, one needs to model accurately the con-
sumption ﬂoor and, at a minimum, the average level of medical expenses by
age and by permanent income.
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40Appendix A: Solving the model
We compute the value functions by backward induction.
We discretize the persistent component and the transitory components of
the health shock into Markovs Chain following Tauchen and Hussey (1991),
and we assume that all other state variables lie on a ﬁnite grid.
We solve the value function (and ﬁnd the corresponding policy functions)
at all of the points in our state space. We use linear interpolation within
the grid and linear extrapolation outside of the grid to evaluate the value
function at points that we do not directly compute.





















xt − ct + y
￿























ψt+1(l,n) = ζt+1(l) + ξt+1(n),
where k ∈ {1,...,dm} indexes health status, l ∈ {1,...,dζ} indexes persistent
health cost shocks, and n ∈ {1,...,dξ} indexes transitory health cost shocks.
41Appendix B: Moment conditions and the asymptotic
distribution of parameter estimates
Our estimate, ˆ ∆, of the “true” preference vector ∆0 is the value of ∆ that
minimizes the (weighted) distance between the estimated life cycle proﬁles
for assets found in the data and the simulated proﬁles generated by the
model. For each calendar year t ∈ {t0,...,tT} = {1995,1998,2000,2002},
we match median assets for 5 permanent income quintiles in 4 birth year
cohorts. The 1995 (period-t0) distribution of simulated assets, however, is
bootstrapped from the 1995 data distribution, and is thus independent of
the model’s parameters. In the end we have a total of 20T = 60 moment
conditions.
The way in which we construct these moment conditions is similar to
the approach described in French and Jones [20]. Let q ∈ {1,2,...,5} index
permanent income quintiles. In this study, we convert permanent income,
I, into a ordinal ranking lying in the 0 − 1 interval. This transformation
removes any sampling uncertainty over the boundaries of the permanent
income quintiles, as the ﬁrst quintile contains households with permanent
income between 0 and 0.2, and so on. Suppose that individual i belongs to
birth cohort c, and his permanent income level falls in the qth permanent
income quintile. Let acqt(∆,χ) denote the model-predicted median asset level
for individuals in individual I’s group at time t. Assuming that observed
assets have a continuous conditional density, acqt will satisfy
Pr
￿
˜ ait ≤ acqt(∆0,χ0)|c,q,t,individual i observed at t
￿
= 1/2.
As is well-known (see Manski [31], Powell [37] and Buchinsky [6]), the pre-
ceding equation can be used to construct a method-of-moments estimator.
In particular, applying the indicator function produces
E
￿
1{˜ ait ≤ acqt(∆0,χ0)} − 1/2|c,q,t,individual i observed at t
￿
= 0. (19)
Equation (19) is merely equation (16) in the main text, adjusted to allow
for “missing” as well as deceased individuals, as in French and Jones [21].

















42for c ∈ {1,2,...,C}, q ∈ {1,2,...,Q}, t ∈ {t1,t2...,tT}.
Suppose we have a data set of I independent individuals that are each
observed at T separate calendar years. Let ϕ(∆;χ0) denote the 20T-element
vector of moment conditions described immediately above, and let ˆ ϕI(.) de-
note its sample analog. Letting c WI denote a 20T × 20T weighting matrix,






′c WI ˆ ϕI(∆;χ0),
where τ is the ratio of the number of observations to the number of simulated
observations.
In practice, we estimate χ0 as well, using the approach described in the
main text. Computational concerns, however, compel us to treat χ0 as known
in the analysis that follows. Under regularity conditions stated in Pakes and
Pollard [34] and Duﬃe and Singleton [14], the MSM estimator ˆ θ is both




ˆ ∆ − ∆0
￿
  N(0,V),
with the variance-covariance matrix V given by















is the 20T × 4 gradient matrix of the population moment vector; and W =






−1ˆ ϕI(ˆ ∆;χ0)   χ
2
20T−4,
where R−1 is the generalized inverse of
R = PSP,




The asymptotically eﬃcient weighting matrix arises when c WI converges
to S−1, the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the data. When
43W = S−1, V simpliﬁes to (1+τ)(D′S−1D)−1, and R is replaced with S. But
even though the optimal weighting matrix is asymptotically eﬃcient, it can
be severely biased in small samples. (See, for example, Altonji and Segal [1].)
We thus use a “diagonal” weighting matrix, as suggested by Pischke [36]. The
diagonal weighting scheme uses the inverse of the matrix that is the same as
S along the diagonal and has zeros oﬀ the diagonal of the matrix.
We estimate D, S and W with their sample analogs. For example, our
estimate of S is the 20T × 20T estimated variance-covariance matrix of the
sample data. When estimating preferences, we use sample statistics, so that
acqt(∆,χ) is replaced with the sample median for group cqt. When comput-
ing the chi-square statistic and the standard errors, we use model predictions,
so that the sample median for group cqt is replaced with its simulated coun-
terpart, acqt(ˆ ∆, ˆ χ).
One complication in estimating the gradient matrix D is that the func-
tions inside the moment condition ϕ(∆;χ) are non-diﬀerentiable at certain
data points; see equation (20). This means that we cannot consistently esti-
mate D as the numerical derivative of ˆ ϕI(.). Our asymptotic results therefore
do not follow from the standard GMM approach, but rather the approach
for non-smooth functions described in Pakes and Pollard [34], Newey and
McFadden [33] (section 7) and Powell [37].
To ﬁnd D, it is helpful to rewrite equation (20) as
Pr
￿




























It follows that the rows of D are given by
Pr
￿



























, the conditional p.d.f. of assets evaluated
at the median acqt, with a kernel density estimator written by Ruud Koenig.
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